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The Prisoners’ Dilemma is perhaps the most famous model in the field of game theory.
Consequently, it is natural to investigate its quantum version when one considers to
apply quantum strategies to game theory. There are two main results in this paper: 1)
The well-known Prisoners’ Dilemma can be categorized into three types and only the
third type is adaptable for quantum strategies. 2) As a reverse problem of game theory,
mechanism design provides a better circumstance for quantum strategies than game
theory does.
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1. Introduction
Game theory and mechanism design are two important branches of economics.
Game theory aims to investigate rational decision making in conflict situations,
whereas mechanism design just concerns the reverse question: given some desirable
outcomes, can we design a game that produces it?
In 1999, Eisert et al 1 proposed a pioneering quantum-version model of two-
player Prisoners’ Dilemma. The novel model showed a fascinating “quantum ad-
vantages” as a result of a novel quantum Nash equilibrium. Guo et al 2 gave a good
review on quantum games. In 2010, Wu 3 investigated what would happen if agents
could use quantum strategies in the theory of mechanism design. The result was
interesting, i.e., by virtue of a quantum mechanism, agents who satisfied a certain
condition could combat “bad” social choice rules instead of being restricted by the
traditional mechanism design theory.
Despite the aforementioned accomplishments in quantum games, in 2002, van
Enk and Pike 4 criticized that a quantum game was indeed a new game that was
constructed and solved, not the original classical game. In this paper, we will deeply
investigate whether and when quantum strategies are useful for economic society.
In Section 2, we will analyze the justification of applying quantum strategies to the
Prisoners’ Dilemma. In Section 3, we will investigate the justification of applying
quantum strategies to mechanism design. Section 4 draws the conclusions.
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2. The justification of applying quantum strategies to the
Prisoners’ Dilemma
2.1. Three types of Prisoners’ Dilemma
As is well known, the Prisoners’ Dilemma is a simple model that captures the es-
sential contradiction between individual rationality and global rationality. In the
classical Prisoners’ Dilemma, two prisoners are arrested by a policeman. Each pris-
oner must independently choose to cooperate (strategy C) or to defect (strategy
D). Table 1 shows the payoff matrix of two prisoners, Alice and Bob.
Table 1: The payoff matrix of two prisoners. The first entry in the parenthesis
denotes the payoff of Alice and the second stands for the payoff of Bob.
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
Alice
Bob
C D
C (3, 3) (0, 5)
D (5, 0) (1, 1)
Suppose the prisoners are rational, then the unique Nash equilibrium is the
dominant strategy (D, D), while the Pareto optimal strategy is (C, C). Although
the Prisoners’ Dilemma has found widespread applications in many disciplines such
as economics, politics, sociology and so on, perhaps not everybody notice that
actually there are three different types of Prisoners’ Dilemma:
Type-1 Prisoners’ Dilemma: There is no arbitrator to assign payoffs to the
players, i.e., there are only two players in the game, whose payoffs are generated
by the players themselves. For example, let us consider two countries (e.g., US and
Russia) confronted the problem of nuclear disarmament. The strategy C means
“Obeying disarmament”, and D means “Refusing disarmament”. Obviously, in the
nuclear disarmament game, there is no arbitrator and the payoffs of two countries
are generated by themselves.
Type-2 Prisoners’ Dilemma: There is an arbitrator in the game to assign
payoffs to the players. Before the players send strategies to the arbitrator indepen-
dently, they cannot communicate to each other. For example, if the prisoners are
arrested separately, this is the type-2 Prisoners’ Dilemma.
Type-3 Prisoners’ Dilemma: There is an arbitrator in the game to assign
payoffs to the players. Before the players send strategies to the arbitrator indepen-
dently, they can communicate to each other but cannot enter into a binding contract.
For example, if the prisoners are arrested in one room and confront a payoff matrix
specified by Table 1, this is the type-3 Prisoners’ Dilemma. It should be emphasized
that although the rational players all agree that the strategy C will benefit both of
them, they will definitely choose the strategy D when they actually send strategies
to the policeman independently, because (D, D) is the unique dominant strategy.
This is the catch of the dilemma. (Note: If the two players can enter into a binding
contract before they send strategies to the arbitrator, then the game will become a
cooperative game. We simply ignore this case.)
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2.2. Eisert et al’s model
In 1999, the Prisoners’ Dilemma was generalized to a quantum domain 1. Fig.
1 shows the setup of a two-player quantum game. The timing sequence of the
quantum Prisoners’ Dilemma is referred to Ref. 1. Under classical circumstances,
people usually do not discriminate the differences among three types of Prisoners’
Dilemma because they correspond to the same payoff matrix (i.e., Table 1). But in
the context of quantum domain, only the type-3 Prisoners’ Dilemma is adaptable
for quantum strategies. In the following, we explain the three cases in details.
Jˆ
C
+Jˆ
AUˆ
0ψ
Fig. 1. The setup of a two-player quantum game. 
C BUˆ
fψ
Type-1 Prisoners’ Dilemma: Obviously, it is meaningless to consider the
quantum version of type-1 Prisoners’ Dilemma, because in Eisert et al ’s model, the
payoffs of two players are assigned by an arbitrator, which is inconsistent to the
model of type-1 Prisoners’ Dilemma.
Type-2 Prisoners’ Dilemma: In Eisert et al ’s original paper, it is implicit
whether the quantum version of the type-2 Prisoners’ Dilemma is feasible or not.
Here, we will analyze this problem deeply. Initially, the two qubits possessed by the
prisoners are separable. It is impossible for the prisoners themselves to entangle the
two qubits, because they cannot communicate to each other and each prisoner can
only perform a local unitary operation on his/her own qubit. Therefore, we have
to assume that the policeman entangles the two qubits. However, just as van Enk
and Pike have said 4: “.. it seems to us counter to the spirit of the game to have
an attorney or interrogater be helpful to the prisoners and give them an entangled
state”, it is unreasonable to make this assumption.
Furthermore, there are two ways to understand the unreasonableness: 1) Since
the Prisoners’ Dilemma is a game with complete information, the policeman knows
exactly that once the prisoners possess two entangled qubits, they will certainly
choose the quantum strategy (Qˆ, Qˆ) and obtain the Pareto optimal payoffs (3,3).
Therefore, if the policeman does help the prisoners perform entangling operation,
then why doesn’t the policeman assign the Pareto optimal payoffs (3,3) directly to
the prisoners? 2) Since the role of policeman is the arbitrator, it is unreasonable
to require the policeman to have an incentive to help the prisoners better off and
reach their Pareto optimal payoffs.
Consequently, the Eisert et al ’s model is meaningless to the type-2 Prisoners’
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Dilemma.
Type-3 Prisoners’ Dilemma: For this case, the two prisoners can commu-
nicate to each other. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that the two qubits hold by
the prisoners can be entangled by themselves, i.e., the quantum game doesn’t need
a benevolent attorney or interrogater to give the prisoners an entangled state. The
essence of the quantum game is that for the type-3 Prisoners’ Dilemma, the unique
dominant strategy is changed from (Dˆ, Dˆ) to (Qˆ, Qˆ), which results in a Pareto
optimal payoff (3,3).
Now, we have categorized the well-known Prisoners’ Dilemma into three differ-
ent types. It can be seen that Eisert et al ’s model is adaptable only to the type-3
Prisoners’ Dilemma. Can we think that the problem about the justification of ap-
plying quantum strategies to the Prisoners’ Dilemma has been solved? Not yet,
because another serious question arises naturally: Since the policeman also knows
the aforementioned three types of Prisoners’ Dilemma, then why does he allow the
prisoners to communicate to each other and have a chance to use quantum strate-
gies? For the case of the classical Prisoners’ Dilemma, there is no reason for the
policeman to do so.
3. The justification of applying quantum strategies to mechanism
design
3.1. Maskin’s classical theorem
In the field of economics, game theory has a reverse problem, i.e., the theory of
mechanism design. Game theory aims to predict the outcome of a given game,
whereas the theory of mechanism design concerns a “social engineering” question:
given some desirable outcomes, can we design a game that produces it?
There are two important notions in mechanism design theory: social choice rule
(SCR) and mechanism. An SCR specifies the objects that the designer would like
to implement: in each state, she would like to realize some set of outcomes, but
unfortunately, she does not know the true state 5. A mechanism is a representation
of the social institution through which the agents interact with the designer and
with one another: each agent sends a message to the designer, who chooses an
outcome as a function of these strategy choices 6.
Ref. 5 is a fundamental work in the field of mechanism design. It provides
an almost complete characterization of social choice rules (SCRs) that are Nash
implementable. The main results of Ref. 5 are the two following theorems: 1) (Ne-
cessity): If an SCR F is Nash implementable, then it is monotonic. 2) (Sufficiency):
Let n ≥ 3, if an SCR F is monotonic and satisfies no-veto, then it is Nash imple-
mentable.
According to the sufficiency theorem, even if all agents dislike an SCR specified
by the designer, as long as it is monotonic and satisfies no-veto, one can always
construct a mechanism to implement the SCR in Nash equilibrium.
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Fig. 2 The setup of a quantum mechanism. Each agent has a 
quantum coin and a card.  Each agent independently performs 
a local unitary operation on his/her own quantum coin. 
Card 1 
Card 2 
Card n
...
Designer
g(m)
C
C
2ψ 3ψ
3.2. Wu’s quantum mechanism
In 2010, Wu investigated what would happen if agents could use quantum strategies
in the theory of mechanism design 3. The setup of a quantum mechanism is depicted
in Fig. 1. Working steps of the quantum mechanism are referred to Ref. 3.
According to Ref. 3, when condition λ is satisfied, an original Nash imple-
mentable “bad” (i.e., Pareto-inefficient) SCR will no longer be Nash implementable
in the context of quantum domain. The key point of the quantum mechanism is to
carry out a quantum version of n-player type-3 Prisoners’ Dilemma. In the end of
Section 2, we argue that the type-3 Prisoners’ Dilemma is not meaningful either.
However, according to the three reasons listed below, it is natural for us to adopt
the quantum version of the type-3 Prisoners’ Dilemma into the field of mechanism
design.
1) In the theory of mechanism design, there always exists a designer (i.e., the
arbitrator) to assign outcomes to the agents. Hence, the payoffs of the agents are
specified by the arbitrator.
2) When Nash implementation is concerned, agents possess complete informa-
tion. Therefore, it is reasonable to think that agents can communicate to each other
before they send their strategies to the designer independently.
3) In the theory of mechanism design, the designer is at an information disad-
vantage with respect to the agents. He cannot restrict agents from communicating
to each other, so the question in the end of Section 2 is solved. In Wu’s quantum
mechanism, from the viewpoint of the designer, the interface between agents and
the designer is the same as that in the Maskin’s classical mechanism. The designer
cannot discriminate whether the underlying principle of agent’s actions is classical
or quantum mechanical. Put in other words, the designer cannot restrict the agents
from using quantum strategies to reach their Pareto-optimal outcomes.
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4. Conclusions
In this paper, we categorize the well-known Prisoners’ Dilemma into three types,
and point out that Eisert et al ’s model is adaptable only to the type-3 Prisoners’
Dilemma. Moreover, in the context of game theory, it is still unreasonable that the
arbitrator allow the agents to communicate to each other and have a chance to use
quantum strategies. Just as Maskin 7 has said: “Mechanism design provides the
circumstances perhaps most favorable for Nash equilibrium being a good predictor
of human behavior in strategic settings.” , in Section 3, we find that mechanism
design provides a more favorable circumstance for quantum strategies than game
theory does.
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